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Summary 
Presenting the Topic:  
Currently, the world and especially the euro area are facing a severe economic crisis. As my 
Bachelor thesis subject, I have chosen to examine Spain’s historical development as well as 
current economic situation from both a statistical and theoretical perspective.   
 
Purpose and Demarcation:  
The purpose of this paper is to find possible explanations for the on-going crisis by analysing 
economic statistics on Spain, to examine if Spain is a typical EU country or in what ways 
Spain is different, to study if Spain has applied certain economic theories and to look at if the 
existing economic theories could help Spain to solve the on-going economic crisis or if the 
country is in need of something new. This paper has no intention to fully cover the above 
listed issues.  
 
Method:  
To succeed with the aim of this thesis, lectures have been attended, literature and articles have 
been studied and homepages have been used frequently. The material has been used to gather 
relevant information and statistics and to gain knowledge of the mentioned theories as well as 
for the application of these on the Spanish situation.  
 
Conclusion: 
For a deeper understanding of Spain’s situation, it is important to consider that Spain during 
the last decades, compared to other Western European countries, has gone through more 
social changes than any other country, the delay in the Spanish economic development and 
the fact that Spain has experienced regional autonomy, regional differences, low productivity, 
low efficiency, low flexibility, low skills of the workforce and lack of competitiveness in 
foreign trade as well as a climate change.  
 
The deep recessions that followed the housing and construction booms are the main reasons 
for the economic crisis and explain the increase in the unemployment rate, the corporate 
sector indebtedness and the banking crisis in Spain. A weak demand and lower capital inflows 
from abroad further clarify the current situation. Huge amounts of capital will be needed for 
the Spanish banking system to repay its current debts. New structural reforms in the areas of 
education, innovation, increased competition and pension systems have to be enacted.  
 
Spain has to some degree followed the different phases of capitalism and applied among 
others Keynes’ and Friedman’s theories. Both already existing economic theories and new 
ones can be useful to help Spain diminishing today’s economic problems.     
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Presenting the Topic 
At present, the global financial situation is more relentless than ever since the Great Depres-
sion. The 2007 – 2012 global financial crisis has turned the world economy upside-down. 
Large financial institutions have collapsed, bailout of banks by national governments has be-
come commonplace and stock markets around the world have experienced downturns. Besid-
es, e.g. the housing market has been hit hard, which has caused “evictions, foreclosures and 
prolonged unemployment”. The crisis has also among other things resulted in a downturn in 
economic activity, declines in consumer wealth as well as the failure of many mayor busi-
nesses.
1
  
 
One of the EU countries that has been sorely affected by the crisis is Spain, which today faces 
a severe economic crisis. The economic situation in Spain reflects the European sovereign 
debt crisis, which followed the international crisis starting from 2007.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, I have chosen to look into Spain’s economic situation. Last 
autumn, I undertook courses in Spanish economy at Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 
where I gained a better understanding of the on-going crisis and especially its effects in Spain. 
Already before I went to Spain, it was agreed that I should write my thesis about the Spanish 
economy and the crisis.  
 
1.2 Purpose and Demarcation 
This thesis is part of my Bachelor in Economics. The paper intends to deal with possible 
explanations for the economic crisis in Spain. In more detail, it is aimed; 
- to understand the reasons for the on-going crisis by analysing relevant economic 
statistics on Spain, 
- to examine if Spain is a typical EU country or in what ways Spain is different,  
- to study if Spain has applied certain economic theories and  
- to look at if the existing economic theories could help Spain to solve the on-going 
economic crisis or if the country is in need of something new.    
 
To fulfil the stated purpose of this paper, the following is analyzed. To start with, economic 
data on Spain, primarily from after the Second World War and onwards, are examined. 
Furthermore, the paper handles aspects of whether Spain’s development is typical for Kalet-
sky’s first three phases of capitalism. If the crises could have been avoided if Spain during the 
Free Market period had applied theories from the Keynes era and/or the Monetarism is discus-
sed as well as if the present crisis can be solved by existing theories and regulations or if 
something new will be required.  
                                                 
1
 USFN, Global Financial Crisis Timeline: 2007 – 2012. 
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When presenting and analysing the theories, I have chosen to base my disposition on Anatole 
Kaletsky’s theories about capitalism. Kaletsky is a highly appreciated and awarded Editor-at-
Large and principal economic commentator of The Times and elected to the Governing 
Council of the Royal Economic Society. The reasons for accentuating Kaletsky are that he is 
not a scientist in need of defending existing theories and that he, despite of this, still has an 
extremely wide understanding of today’s economic and financial situation.   
 
During Kaletsky’s period Capitalism 2, Keynes and his theories are central. When describing 
the period Capitalism 3, I have chosen in excess of Friedman to study the theories of Bernan-
ke, Fisher, Kaminsky, Mishkin, Reinhart, Rogoff and Wihlborg. The last part of the paper 
includes some conclusions. It should be noted that this paper has no intention to fully cover 
the above listed issues. Due to the limited scope of this paper, it instead gives an overview of 
issues relevant for the chosen topic.  
 
1.3 Method 
For the purpose of this thesis, literature, such as Anatole Kaletsky’s Capitalism 4.0: The Birth 
of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis has been studied. José Luis García Delgado’s 
and Rafael Myro’s Lecciones de Economía Española, Carmen M. Reinhart’s and Kenneth 
Rogoff’s This Time is Different – Eight Centuries of Financial Folly and Paul De Grauwe’s 
Economics of Monetary Unions have also made an important contribution to this paper. More-
over, additional literature, articles, mainly from SvD - näringsliv and statistics from Eurostat 
and others have been of importance. The homepage of Banco de España’s as well as other 
international homepages have been used frequently. The material has been used to gather 
relevant information and statistics and to gain knowledge of the mentioned theories as well as 
for the application of these on the Spanish situation. I have tried to approach the material 
critically in order to decrease the risk of presenting personal pre-understanding and the like.  
 
Besides, I have received great support from my supervisor Lecturer Hans Hansson and his 
book Internationell ekonomi has given me a better general understanding of the subject. 
  
1.4 Disposition  
Initially, the first three phases of capitalism will be presented (Paragraph 2.1). Capitalism 1 
will be dealt with shortly, followed by a more thorough study of Capitalism 2 and Capitalism 
3. Thereafter, theories such as Keynes’, Friedman’s and others, will be examined in connec-
tion with its relevant phase (Paragraphs 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.3.1 – 2.1.3.5). Relevant information 
about Spain and the Spanish Economy will then be dealt with (Chapter 3). After that Capital-
ism 4.0 will be defined (Chapter 4). Subsequently, in the theoretical analysing part, Spain’s 
situation during the different phases of capitalism will be assessed (Paragraph 5.1). Finally, 
before certain conclusions will be drawn (Chapter 6), additional relevant questions will be 
examined (Paragraph 5.2).          
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2 Background 
2.1 The Three First Phases of Capitalism 
Anatole Kaletsky states that Capitalism has gone through three extensive phases since 1776 
and that we now are in need of a new phase called Capitalism 4.0. Each stage has been 
influenced by a number of politicians and economists and has commenced by a period of 
turmoil. The differences of most importance between the different phases concern among 
other things the relationships between politics and economics and between governments and 
markets.
2
  
 
According to Kaletsky, capitalism has always been an adaptive social system, instead of 
following a static set of rules, and develops in response to the changing environment.
3
 Human 
compulsions, like ambition, initiative, individualism and competitive spirit, will continue 
powering the capitalist system and creating a new version of capitalism that will eventually be 
even more flourishing and fruitful than the out-phased system.
4
 In the rest of this chapter, the 
three first stages of capitalism will be described.          
 
2.1.1 Capitalism 1 
The first phase consists of the following underlying phases:  
Capitalism 1.0: from 1776, the U.S. Declaration of Independence and The Wealth of Nations, 
to 1815, the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo 
Capitalism 1.1: from 1820 to 1849 
Capitalism 1.2: from 1848-49, Europe’s Year of Revolutions, the repeal of the Corn Laws, 
and the Navigation Acts, until the late 1860s, during the aftermath of the U.S Civil War and 
the Franco-Prussian War 
Capitalism 1.3: from 1870 to 1914, the United States’ Gilded Age or the Second Industrial 
Revolution 
Capitalism 1.4: from 1917 until 1932, the period of disintegration, when capitalism came 
closer to genuine collapse than ever before or since  
 
Social and economic upheaval defines the first phase of capitalism, where politics and econo-
mics were basically unrelated spheres of human activity that had to stay distinct in the inter-
ests of both economic and political evolution.
5
 Government and market intervention were re-
stricted to collect taxes and protect commanding political interests by building tariff barriers.
6
 
When examining the first phase, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Lenin, Hoover, Hitler 
                                                 
2
 Kaletsky, A, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy, page 4. 
3
 Ibid., page 2f. 
4
 Ibid., page 1f.   
5
 Ibid., page 38f. 
6
 Ibid., page 4. 
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and others are of interest.
7
 They found it obvious that the capitalist economy and policy would 
rise or fall together; they would either cause human happiness or human distress.  
 
In addition, the cohering ideology of the first phase of capitalism stated that due to the strict 
laws of market economics, government interventions should be avoided in business activity. 
Political reforms may have solved systematic tensions caused by capitalism but it was not part 
of economic theories. This separation led to Capitalism 2.0.
8
 
 
2.1.2 Capitalism 2 
The following underlying phases are part of the second stage of capitalism: 
Capitalism 2.0: from 1931-38, the abandonment of gold and New Deal experimentation 
Capitalism 2.1: from 1935-45, government-led militarism 
Capitalism 2.2: from 1946-69, the Keynesian Golden Age 
Capitalism 2.3: from 1970-1980, inflation, the energy crisis, and the breakdown of the post-
war gold-backed currency system
9
 
 
The definition of the second phase of capitalism is “an almost romantic faith in benign, all-
knowing governments and an instinctive distrust of markets, especially financial markets”. It 
was commonly agreed that governments were at all times right and markets almost always 
wrong.
10
 Furthermore, “the single most important function of government was to manage the 
economy, by taming and controlling unstable market forces”. During this phase Roosevelt, 
Keynes, Nixon and Carter were amongst the most influential people and especially Keynes 
played an important role. Keynes ideology will be described in paragraph 2.1.2.1. In Capital-
ism 2.0 economics became fundamentally a chunk of politics.
11
 Many European countries
12
 
took part in a blockade in the mid-1970s, where most economies tried to defend their curren-
cies against rough attacks from the currency markets, which resulted in recessions with 
extremely high interest rates.
13
 Additionally, at the end of the second phase, stagflation had 
become a fact, “a lethal combination of high inflation and mass unemployment”.14          
 
2.1.2.1 John Maynard Keynes  
The time period between 1946 and 1969 is described to be “the most successful period of 
economic management”. During this period, called the Golden Age of Keynesian economics, 
living standards were high together with great technological progress and financial stability.
15
  
                                                 
7
 Kaletsky, A, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy, page 45. 
8
 Ibid., page 39f. 
9
 Ibid., page 49. 
10
 Ibid., page 4f. 
11
 Ibid., page 39f. 
12
 Great Britain, France and Italy along with many other economies.    
13
 Kaletsky, A, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy, page 82. 
14
 Ibid., page 51. 
15
 Ibid., page 50. 
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Keynes' ideologies and especially his monetary theory have been of crucial importance for 
modern macroeconomics as well as for economic policies of governments and for “the mone-
tarists”. He pointed out that when demand is deficient, governments should boost public 
spending in order to counter unemployment. His economic system states that governments are 
in need of an active employment policy. Besides, he advocated the use of fiscal and monetary 
measures to ease the adverse effects of economic recessions and depressions. These macro 
theoretical ideas are the basis for the concept Keynesianism.  
 
Moreover, Keynes' doctrine emphasizes the importance of aggregate demand for full employ-
ment and orders government control of demand through public spending as the most efficient 
mean for cyclical policies.
16
 Keynes did not agree with neoclassical economics. Instead he 
meant that the general level of economic activity was concluded by aggregate demand at the 
same time as long-drawn-out periods of high unemployment could be a result of insufficient 
aggregate demand. Most capitalist governments adopted Keynes' ideas concerning economic 
policy during the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
Unemployment can sometimes have “a crucial disciplining effect” in economic systems due 
to their “natural tensions over the distribution of wages and profits between workers and 
capitalists”.17 “According to Keynes, business expectations could be affected by “animal 
spirits” reflecting changes in technology or in geopolitical and social conditions, as well as 
monetary policy”. The amount of capital in the economy can be increased by high rates of 
investment during periods of optimism. In addition, production can be raised at an acceler-
ating pace. On the other hand, job losses, declining incomes as well as further falls in con-
sumptions are caused by a sharp decline in investment. Further on “this depresses business 
expectations even more” and in the long run there might be no escape. One way out of the 
problem may be to use “government spending and borrowing, plus direct action to push 
credit into the economy”.       
 
Furthermore, it is commonly argued, by post-Keynesians, “that advanced capitalism general-
ly shifts income distribution in favor of profits and away from wages, partly because of tech-
nological progress and monopoly, and partly for political reasons such as restrictions on org-
anized labor.”At occasions, like the one just mentioned, government has “to support demand 
with deficit financing and for the banking system to expand credit to poorer and less credit-
worthy borrowers”. As long as sufficient demand is created, rationally full employment can 
be operated by the economy but as soon as “income distribution continues to move against 
labour” a financial crisis becomes true.18  
 
                                                 
16
 Various Authors, Stora Focus: inn-kol, page 257. 
17
 Kaletsky, A, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy, page 52. 
18
 Ibid., page 119f. 
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Due to that Keynes' thoughts about “the crucial role of government in economic manage-
ment” turned out to be forgotten during the third phase of capitalism “many successful busi-
nessmen and politicians genuinely believed that financial markets were automatically self-
stabilizing and that government intervention in the economy would always do more harm than 
good”.19  
 
2.1.3 Capitalism 3 
The third stage consists of the following underlying phases: 
Capitalism 3.0: from 1979-83, early monetarism and confrontations with unions 
Capitalism 3.1: from 1984-92, Volcker and Greenspan, Thatcher-Reagan booms 
Capitalism 3.2: from 1992-2000, the Great Moderation 
Capitalism 3.3: from 2001-08, market fundamentalism under Greenspan and Georg W. 
Bush
20
 
 
This third phase of capitalism “romanticized markets and distrusted government”. It was 
“assumed that markets were always right and governments nearly always wrong” and almost 
always inefficient. In addition, regulation was said to be ridiculous and public administration 
was treated with open disrespect.
21
 During the third stage, influence was given from among 
others, Thatcher, Reagan, Friedman, Bush, Paulson and Greenspan. Friedman's philosophy 
will be dealt with in paragraph 2.1.3.1. Politics was treated “as a branch of economics” 
instead of as treating economics “as a branch of politics”. “Markets should be empowered 
wherever possible to discipline and control venal politicians.” The 2007 - 09 crisis was the 
end of the era of market fundamentalism.
22
  
 
Moreover, the only way to balance a capitalist economy, in other words, to produce “efficient 
and rational outcomes” such as no unemployment and economic stability, was to keep “free, 
competitive markets, provided they were not distorted by state intervention”.23 By 1989, in 
those countries that had adopted the new free-market model most willingly, inflationary pres-
sures caved in. “Structural obstacles to competition that had been largely responsible for the 
stagflation of the preceding decade” had then weakened. By 1994, the persistent currency 
crisis in among other countries Spain had been eliminated by the development toward the 
monetary union, where Spain over time gained influence over the euro project.
24
 Before the 
2007 - 09 crisis, it was assumed that "competitive markets move automatically toward equili-
brium, that financial cycles have little or no effect on long-term economic performance, and 
that a properly functioning private-enterprise economy will always remain near full 
                                                 
19
 Kaletsky, A, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy, page 133. 
20
 Ibid., page 53. 
21
 Ibid., page 4f. 
22
 Ibid., page 40f. 
23
 Ibid., page 51f.  
24
 Ibid., page 82f. 
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employment, leaving only one important role for government macroeconomic policy, which is 
to keep inflation under control".
25
 
 
2.1.3.1 Milton Friedman 
Friedman emphasized the monetarism’s relevance for the economy. He stated that to “restrict 
growth in the money supply” it was necessary “to bring inflation under control”. Monetary 
policy had to be returned to centre stage. Friedman denied Keynes’ government theories and 
advocated that governments could decrease unemployment under the “natural” rate of unem-
ployment only by risking the inflation to accelerate. He underlined that “inflation is always 
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” and that “substantial changes in prices is almost 
always the result of changes in the nominal supply of money”. Friedman also stated that in the 
short-run, economic activity and employment will be reduced by tightening the supply of 
money but in the long-run, due to “stable and predictable environment which sound money 
provides”, economic activity will recover.26 Besides, the wisest policy was to expand the 
money supply slowly and constantly. He advocated a free market economic system with as 
little government intervention as possible, freely floating exchange rates, a negative income 
tax as well as volunteer military.
27
         
 
Milton Friedman blamed the decision to liquidate the U.S. banking system as “the main 
reason of the Great Depression”.28    
 
2.1.3.2 Ben Bernanke and Irving Fisher  
Ben Bernanke is an American economist and currently chairman of the Federal Reserve. He 
claims that preserving price stability is of huge importance, both deflation and inflation 
should be avoided and that “the sources of deflation are not a mystery. Deflation is in almost 
all cases a side effect of a collapse of aggregate demand – a drop in spending so severe that 
producers must cut prices on an ongoing basis in order to find buyers. Likewise, the economic 
effects of a deflationary episode, for the most part, are similar to those of any other sharp 
decline in aggregate spending—namely, recession, rising unemployment, and financial 
stress." When a country has its currency regulated under a system that is tied to a central 
bank, the interest rate can be influenced by the monetary authority. Moreover, Bernanke 
stressed that any deflation that might occur can be ensured by the central bank to be both mild 
and brief if the central bank has the sufficient policy instruments needed.
29
   
 
According to Bernanke, the following should be done by the central bank to prevent deflation;  
1. “Increase the money supply.” 
                                                 
25
 Kaletsky, A, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy, page 8f. 
26
 Hague, R and Harrop, M, Comparative Government and Politics – An Introduction, page 144f.  
27
 Reason Magazine, Best of Both Worlds. 
28
 Kaletsky, A, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy, page 131. 
29
 The Federal Reserve Board, Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here. 
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2. “Ensure liquidity makes its way into the financial system through a variety of 
measures.” 
3. “Lower interest rates – all the way down to 0 per cent.”   
4. “Control the yield on corporate bonds and other privately issued securities.” 
5. “Depreciate the U.S. dollar.”  
6. “Execute a de facto depreciation by buying foreign currencies on a massive scale.” 
7. “Buy industries throughout the U.S. economy with “newly created money”.”30  
 
Bernanke’s theory is called the Bernanke doctrine, and is defined to be the "the overpowering 
use of monetary policies and lending" to handle economic crises.
31
 In summary, the Bernanke 
doctrine states that “We at the Federal Reserve will do all that we can to prevent fraud and 
abusive lending and to ensure that lenders employ sound underwriting practices and make 
effective disclosures to consumers. At the same time, we must be careful not to inadvertently 
suppress responsible lending or eliminate refinancing opportunities for subprime borrowers. 
Together with other regulators and the Congress, our success in balancing these objectives 
will have significant implications for the financial well-being, access to credit, and opportuni-
ties for homeownership of many of our fellow citizens.”32  
 
Furthermore, Bernanke’s doctrine has been influenced by Irving Fisher’s33 debt-deflation 
theory, a theory of economic crisis. Fisher’s theory states that “the bursting of the credit 
bubble unleashes a series of effects that have serious negative impact on the real economy”. 
Also, Fisher pointed that “over investment and over speculation are often important; but they 
would have far less serious results were they not conducted with borrowed money. The very 
effort of individuals to lessen their burden of debts increases it, because of the mass effect of 
the stampede to liquidate… the more debtors pay, the more they owe. The more the economic 
boat tips, the more it tends to tip”.34 By examining debt, price trends and balance of payments 
deficit you can study if price falls have caused a greater real debt for households and compa-
nies as well as for banks. If this is the case, the economy is said to have become short-circu-
ited.       
 
According to Financial Post, “European leaders may have no choice but to invoke the Ber-
nanke doctrine of overwhelming force now that Europe's sovereign debt crisis threatens to 
send the global economy back into recession.”35 
  
  
                                                 
30
 The Federal Reserve Board, Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here. 
31
 The New York Times, With bold steps, Bernanke revamps Fed rule book. 
32
 Minyanville, See Only One Thing You Need to Know: The Bernanke Put. 
33
 Irving Fisher was one of the earliest American neoclassical economists.  
34
 The Economist, Irving Fisher – Out of Keynes’s Shadow. 
35
 Financial Post, Is Bernanke Doctrine headed to Europe?. 
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2.1.3.3 Frederic S. Mishkin  
Frederic S. Mishkin, was a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
between 2006 and 2008. He considers uneven spread information to be the fundamental cause 
of financial crisis occurrence.
36
  
 
According to Mishkin, five lessons exist “that should change how we think about the science 
of monetary policy and monetary policy strategy”37, namely; 
1. “Developments in the financial sector have a far greater impact on economic activity 
than we earlier realized.” 
“Although central bankers generally recognized that financial frictions could play an 
important role in business cycle fluctuations, the 2007-2009 financial crisis made it clear 
that the adverse effects of financial disruptions on economic activity could be far worse 
than was anticipated for advanced economies.” In the beginning of the financial crisis, it 
seemed to be possible for “central bank actions to contain it” and there was a hope 
among many officials at the central banks “that the worst was over and that the financial 
system would begin to recover”. But by the autumn of 2008, “a set of shocks which sent 
the financial system and the economy over the cliff” enhanced. “The world-wide recession 
that resulted from the financial crisis turned out to be the most severe economic contrac-
tion since the world-wide depression of the 1930s.”38 
 
2. “The macro economy is highly nonlinear.” 
For example, “economic downturns typically result in even greater uncertainty about 
asset values”, which “may involve an adverse feedback loop whereby financial disrupt-
tions cause investment and consumer spending to decline, which, in turn, causes economic 
activity to contract”. Such contraction “increases uncertainty about the value of assets, 
and, as a result, the financial disruption worsens”.39  
 
3. “The zero lower bound is more problematic than we realized.” 
One explanation why “the zero-lower-bound problem is more serious than previously 
thought is that we now see that contractionary shocks to the economy can be far greater 
than was previously anticipated” due to “the presence of nonlinearities and large tail 
risks. Sufficiently large contractionary shocks can make the magnitude of the costs of the 
zero-lower-bound constraint very large. Large contractionary shocks can thus overwhelm 
the ability of conventional policy to counteract them, and may require massive interven-
tions in credit markets and central bank expansion of their balance sheets.”40 
 
                                                 
36
 Hansson, H., Internationell ekonomi, page 259. 
37
 Mishkin, F, Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis, page 21f. 
38
 Ibid., page 22f.  
39
 Ibid., page 24f. 
40
 Ibid., page 25f. 
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4. “The cost of cleaning up after financial crises is very high.” 
The global financial crisis has resulted in four different types of “costs”. “Besides the 
obvious cost of a huge loss of aggregate output as a result of the worldwide recession”, a 
very slow growth and a sharp deterioration between the budgetary position of govern-
ments are typical results. In addition, “the exit strategy for central banks from nonconven-
tional monetary policy may be both complicated and hinder the ability of the central bank 
to successfully manage the economy in the future”.41 
 
5. “Price and output stability do not ensure financial stability.” 
“Before the recent financial crisis, the common view, both in academia and in central 
banks was that achieving price and output stability would promote financial stability. The 
benign economic environment leading up to 2007, however, surely did not protect the 
economy from financial instability.” Recently, it has even been suggested “that benign 
economic environments may promote excessive risk taking and may actually make the 
financial system more fragile.”42 
 
Furthermore, Mishkin means that “much of the science of monetary policy remain impact”. 
However, some rethinking is necessary regarding the basic framework for monetary policy 
strategy. “The linear-quadratic framework for thinking about how to conduct monetary policy 
when there is a financial disruption” must be abandoned. Besides, monetary policy has to be 
used when pursuing financial stability goals at the same time as research on how to monitor 
credit conditions must be of bigger importance in the future. Also, as a result of the financial 
crisis, it has become a fact “that monetary policy and financial stability policy are closely 
intertwined”.43      
 
2.1.3.4 Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff and Graciela L. Kaminsky.  
Carmen M. Reinhart is among other things a research associate at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Kenneth Rogoff is currently the Thomas D. Cabot Professor of public 
policy and professor of economics at Harvard University. Graciela L. Kaminsky is a professor 
of economics and international affairs at the George Washington University in Washington 
DC. 
 
This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly “presents a comprehensive look at 
the varieties of financial crisis.” Among other things, Reinhart and Rogoff mean that “a 
boom in real housing prices in the run-up to a crisis is followed by a marked decline in the 
year of the crisis and subsequent years. Banking crisis tends to occur either at the peak of a 
boom in real housing prices or right after the bust.”44  
                                                 
41
 Mishkin, F, Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis, page 28f. 
42
 Ibid., page 31f. 
43
 Ibid., page 21f.  
44
 Reinhart, C, and Rogoff, K, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, page 159. 
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The fact that many other countries, including Spain, experienced economic difficulties at the 
same time as the United States can be explained by “that many of the features that character-
ized the run-up to the subprime crisis in the United States were present in other advanced 
economies as well”. To start with, “many countries in Europe and elsewhere had their own 
home-grown real estate bubbles”. Secondly, “the United States was not alone in running 
large current account deficits and experiencing a sustained “capital flow bonanza””. Spain 
was one of the countries which were “importing capital from abroad, which helped fuel a 
credit and asset price boom”. As a result, these countries got “vulnerable to the usual nasty 
consequences of asset market crashes and capital flow reversals irrespective of what may 
have been happening in the United States”.45 
 
Moreover, in the future, “it would be helpful to keep track of some basic macroeconomic 
series on housing prices and debt and calibrate them against historical benchmarks taken 
from past deep financial crisis” when we are on a run-up to a subprime financial crisis. 46  
 
Additionally, “international institutions can play an important role in reducing risk, first by 
promoting transparency in reporting data and second by enforcing regulations related to 
leverage”.47    
 
In the work The Twin Crisis: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems,  
Kaminsky and Reinhart examine the links between banking and currency crisis. They come to 
the conclusion that “problems in the banking sector typically precede a currency crisis—the 
currency crisis deepens the banking crisis, activating a vicious spiral; financial liberalization 
often precedes banking crises”. In addition, they state that “crises occur as the economy 
enters a recession, following a prolonged boom in economic activity that was fuelled by 
credit, capital inflows, and accompanied by an overvalued currency”.48 
 
Moreover, they have found that “banking and currency crises are closely linked in the after-
math of financial liberalization, with banking crises, in general, beginning before the curren-
cy collapse”. Additionally, “when currency and banking crises occur jointly, they are far 
more severe than when they occur in isolation”.49  
 
Their studies have resulted in assessing “the complex linkages between currency and domestic 
financial crisis”. “Analyzing how the authorities deal with the banking problems and how the 
                                                 
45
 Reinhart, C, and Rogoff, K, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, page 242f. 
46
 Ibid., page 277. 
47
 Ibid., page 281. 
48
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page 473. 
49
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problems affect exchange-rate expectations will help determine whether a banking crisis will 
lead to a balance-of-payments crisis.”50  
 
Most often, “balance-of-payments crises are resolved through a devaluation of the domestic 
currency or the floatation of the exchange rate”.51  
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart further looked into the way a currency and banking crisis are linked. 
The probability that a country will fall prey to a currency, increases when a banking crisis 
occurs. It has been argued that “in an important number of cases, the bailout of the banking 
system may have contributed to the acceleration in credit creation observed prior to the 
currency crises”. Knowing though that a currency crisis exists “does not help predict the 
onset of a banking crisis” but to have the knowledge that “there was a currency crisis does 
help to predict the probability that the banking crisis will worsen”. “Bailout costs are signi-
ficantly larger in the twin crises than for banking crises which were not accompanied by a 
currency crisis”.52 
 
Furthermore, “the twin crises may have common origins in the deregulation of the financial 
system and the boom-bust cycles and asset bubbles that, all too often, accompany financial 
liberalization”. They suggest that “inadequate regulation and lack of supervision at the time 
of the liberalization may play a key role in explaining why deregulation and banking crises 
are so closely entwined”.53 
 
2.1.3.5 Clas Wihlborg   
Clas Wihlborg is professor at the Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman 
University, California. According to Wihlborg
54
, “the banks holding much of the sovereign 
debt of the Southern Euro-zone have become both “too big to fail” and “too big to save””. 
This fact explains why the debt problems among EMU countries get so irresolute response 
from the EU. The Southern European problems are said to be “mainly self-inflicted but with-
out resolution of the viability of the common currency it threatened”.  Fiscal profligacy is one 
explanation for the crisis but many more exist. 
 
Moreover, banking risk and sovereign risk go together. Each country is in need of creating 
current account surpluses. Banks, which have taken “stupid” decisions, bear the debt on their 
shoulders. There are many uncertainties about the future, no credibility about governments 
and big differences between liquidity and solvency problems.  
                                                 
50
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Besides, “during the tech bubble: shareholder took losses without serious repercussions, 
during the subprime crisis, leveraged
55
 financial institutions could not absorb losses without 
massive failures and during the sovereign debt crisis, leveraged banks in Europe must absorb 
losses competitive diverging”. 
 
In addition, one important problem is that there are no incentives to say that banks are in good 
shape because then they will not get any aid. Therefore, we end up in a situation where banks 
are neither in good nor bad shape, nor healthy nor broke, we get a credit crush and the situa-
tion get worse. 
 
The euro system reduces transactions costs and exchange risks, but neglects macroeconomic 
costs. The optimal currency area should have led to labour mobility and flexibility of wages 
but that has not been the case. Europe has not had any labour mobility, at the same time, as 
wages have been relatively rigid. Initially, there was a hope for an endogenous optimal cur-
rency area, which would lead to labour mobility and flexible wages automatically. 
 
According to Wihlborg, we have to close insolvent banks, big ones as well, due to that it 
would lead us out of the current credit crunch situation, but no efficient regimes to allocate 
losses beyond bank shareholders exist. Further on, the euro debt crisis is not just fiscal, the 
policy responses to resolve the sovereign debt crisis have focused on fiscal measures and 
bailout loans have been made conditional on fiscal austerity with increasing strictness. 
  
                                                 
55
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3 The Spanish Economy and a Statistical Analysis 
3.1 Information and Statistics on Spain 
3.1.1 Overview 
Spain has, compared to other Western European countries, undergone more social changes 
than any other country in the last 40 years. In the 1950s, Spain experienced poverty and was 
mainly a rural country. Consequently, Spain was internationally isolated due to the Franco 
regime and nearly “starved”. The possibility to import from the West was strictly limited. 
Thanks to that the US helped Spain by giving aid in return for accepting military bases, Spain 
could rise again and start investing.
56
   
 
In the 1930s, Spain was a republic, which was 
ruined during the Spanish Civil War. Before that, 
during the 1920s, Spain had been a dictatorship 
caused by the political instability of the late 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries. The dictatorship was 
relatively benign and was supported by parts of 
the working class. During the Franco-era, Spain 
suffered during a devastating draught, the black 
market flourished and Franco taught people his 
extreme form of isolationism and self-suffici-
ency.
57
    
 
A remarkable economic growth took place in the 1960s, mostly due to a growing tourist 
industry. General Franco ruled by authoritarianism until his death in 1975 and since then 
Spain has been a democratic state. Furthermore, during the 1980s, Spain started modernizing 
and both service industries and manufacturing expanded, which led to that Spain could enjoy 
an economic boom. Even though this was the case, the European Union GDP average has 
remained higher than 
Spain’s GDP and growth 
in Spain has been very 
unequally spread around 
the country. The GDP per 
capita in PPS diagram 
shows Spain’s, the euro 
area (17)’s and the EU 
(15)’s GDP growth com-
pared to EU (27) as an 
index. Agriculture is of big 
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importance, but its efficiency differs among the regions. Up until the mid-1990s, Spain’s in-
ternational standing has been increased by the Socialists and Spain’s memberships of NATO 
and the European Union have strengthened Spain’s international relations.58  
 
A common culture has several times tried to be imposed by a succession of rules, but Spain’s 
cultural diverseness has always remained. A strong sense of their own independent identities 
has been maintained by several regions and a considerable power has been devolved to the 
different regions. Basques and Catalans are examples of inhabitants who do not consider 
themselves to be Spanish.
59
     
 
Even though improvements have been made in providing public services, Spain’s government 
has traditionally been very inefficient. Subsequently, to seek assistance in a crisis, the Spanish 
people have always relied on their families and relatives.
60
    
 
3.1.2 Economic Growth and Structural Changes 
During the second half of the 20
th
 century, especially until the mid-1970s, Europe and Spain 
have experienced a fast economic growth in GDP per capita. Consequently, the labour market 
has experienced many changes.
61
    
 
In comparison with other EU-15 
countries, Spain has shown a 
greater economic growth, 3.1 per 
cent annually compared to 2.4 
per cent annually, which may be 
due to the delay in Spain’s 
economic development. It is 
possible to differentiate four 
phases for the economic growth 
in Spain, namely;   
1. From 1960 until the first half of the 1970s: fast economic growth given the structural 
changes in industry, agriculture, foreign investments, and so on after the 1950s. 
2. Second half of 1970s until 1984: economic crisis and divergence with Europe given 
the changes in the social and institutional situation in Spain. 
3. 1985 to mid-1990s: ten years with a complete economic or business cycle after the 
introduction of Spain in the European Union. 
4. From mid-1990s to 2007: macroeconomic stability.62 
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An increase in the GDP per capita might be caused by an increase in the proportion of the 
population actually working or might be due to an increase in the ratio of productivity or 
average production per worker. Thus, when examining economic growth in the long run, 
labour productivity and employment rates are of importance. In 1991, the labour force in 
Spain accounted to 15 813 897 people and in 2010 to 23 232 546 people.
63
 Between 1961 and 
1985, the annual cumulative real GDP per employee was 4.9 and the annual cumulative pro-
portion of the total population employed was -1.3. Between 1986 and 2010 the same numbers 
were 1.0 and 1.3.
64
    
 
Labour productivity is based on capital, 
labour and technological progress. In the 
1960s, Spain experienced an increase in 
the production level as well as a parallel 
increase in the productivity compensating 
the increase in wages. The Spanish 
government, in order to limit the inflation 
and the enormous differences between 
exports and imports during the second 
half of the 1970s and the first half of the 
1980s, reduced economic activity. Also, a 
reduction in production and employment together with an increase in prices occurred due to 
the increase in wages and social security expenses for companies dealing with petroleum, 
since Spain was dependent on petroleum, and socio-political changes. Since 1970, growth in 
productivity has decreased and technological progress has slowed down. Later, since 1986, 
economic growth in Spain and Europe has been based more on labour creation than on 
productivity than before but economic growth in Spain has mainly been determined on the 
labour productivity. In addition, Spain has historically had one of the lowest employment 
rates in Europe due to among other 
things low flexibility in both the 
capital and labour markets as well 
as in the productivity market. When 
labour productivity increases more 
than the GDP per capita, the em-
ployment rate decreases, which 
means that a country is normally in 
a recession.
65
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It is important to analyse the comparison between real and potential GDP. The real GDP has 
over time fluctuated more than the potential GDP and in 2008 the real GDP experienced 
negative growth. First in the third quarter of 2011, the GDP growth was positive again, 0.8 
per cent but it is expected to fall this year by 1.5 per cent.
66
 Import and export have become of 
greater importance to the GDP.  
 
Spain was part of an expansion phase during the last part of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s. Firstly, the unem-
ployment rate reduced ra-
pidly, which led to an in-
crease in real wages while 
the labour market remained 
rigid. Moreover, the external 
deficit stalked due to that 
international, internal and 
national demand increased 
as well as the national pri-
ces. Additionally, positive 
shocks on the supply side 
stimulated the production levels. Unfortunately, the increase in demand led to a higher infla-
tion rate, which caused a growing deficit. These results were a result of Spain’s entry into the 
European Union. For example, the unemployment rate fell from 23 per cent in 1986 to 8 per 
cent in mid-2007. After having entered the European Monetary Union, Spain’s interest rates 
decreased and housing prices and 
investments increased. Spain’s flo-
urishing period stopped when the 
international financial crisis started, 
as for most other European count-
ries, and led to a recession starting 
from 2008. Among other things, 
there was a dramatic decline in 
housing sales and construction 
activities and by the end of 2011, 
the unemployment rate fell to the 
same level as in 1986.
67
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3.1.3 Productive Activities  
Largely, the productive sector consists of the primary sector (agriculture, forestry and fish-
ing), which stands for 4 per cent of the Spanish GDP, the secondary sector (industry, energy, 
construction and mining), which stands for 32 per cent of the Spanish GDP, and the tertiary 
sector (services), which stands for 64 per cent of the Spanish GDP.
68
   
 
Structural production changes have led towards a lower weight of the agriculture sector and 
consequently towards a greater weight of the industry and services sectors. Spain has experi-
enced an increase in the qualification of the labour force as well as openness in the econo-
my.
69
  
 
3.1.3.1 The Agricultural Sector  
Regarding the primary sector, the physical conditions for the natural environment in Spain 
have become very adverse to the agriculture’s development. Natural disasters can lead to 
substantial economic losses. For example, in 1999, Spain suffered from 3 billion euros in loss-
es due to a severe drought. The European Environment Agency as well as El País means that 
Spain will be the country most affected by the coming climate change among the EU coun-
tries. Among other things, rainfalls are few and very unevenly distributed at the same time as 
the heat is limiting the water resources, which likely will cause droughts, floods and storms.
70
 
Last winter was the driest winter Spain has ever faced and the lack of rain and snow falls last-
ed throughout February. This fact puts Spain in a very severe situation. 
71
 Consequently, due 
to the high average height of Spain only 10 per cent of the territory in Spain is today suitable 
for productive agriculture.
72
    
 
The increasing loss of significance in the Spanish economy, in terms of both output and 
employment and foreign trade of agriculture, is the most important characteristic for the evo-
lution of agriculture.
73
   
 
The great polarization in Spain between small and large farms has influenced the social, histo-
rical and economic complexity of Spain’s agriculture. Employment in agriculture has declined 
but due to the increase of investment in capital, agriculture has become a sector with high 
capital per employee.
74
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3.1.3.2 The Industrial Sector  
Some important features of the Spanish industry, the secondary sector, are the following. 
Advanced production in Spain progressed between 1986 and 1995. Thereafter followed a 
decrease and now the advanced production has stagnated at a rate that is half the EU-25.  
Spain’s industries are mostly financed by foreign capital. Besides, more traditional industries 
have lost in weight even though they still are of importance for Spain.
75
     
 
In relation to non-EU European countries and major manufacturing industries, Spain has some 
comparative weaknesses. Spain experiences low productivity, due to a smaller proportion of 
capital/labour ratio and a lower total factor productivity.  Besides, Spain spends less on R&D 
and innovation, 1.2 per cent of GDP, compared to the European Union’s average, 1.9 per cent 
of GDP. Other weaknesses are low skills of the workforce, undeveloped international market-
ing as well as lack of competitiveness in foreign trade.
76
  
 
3.1.3.3 The Construction Sector and the Housing Market 
The financial crisis is limited 
to parts of the financial system 
and its main problems concern 
housing and construction 
companies.
77
  
 
Since the 1960s, the home-
ownership ratio in Spain has 
been high and in 2011, the 
ratio reached 82.30 per cent.
78
 
Spain was one of the Europe-
an countries which got most 
badly affected by the present crisis and the construction sector, which previously was behind 
the economic boom in Spain, has stopped abruptly. Many major building projects have been 
stopped half-finished and housing prices have been and are falling.
79
  
 
Between 1985 and 1991, the real estate prices in Spain increased extremely, almost tripled. 
Thereafter, between 1992 and 1996 there were almost no fluctuation and the prices remained 
stable. Up till the crisis started, the real estate prices increased massively again but since 2008 
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they have, as already mentioned, been falling drastically. The percentage increase of real 
housing prices between 2002 and 2006 was higher than 50 per cent.
80
 
 
“Spain’s long period of economic expansion relied on a double boom that produced two large 
and interlinked private sector imbalances.”81 Moreover, “the weight of construction and real 
estate in GDP, employment, and new lending has largely adjusted from previous excessive 
levels, but will likely remain weak as overhangs (including of housing prices and unsold 
units) persist. Private sector debt levels have stabilized at high levels – how much they have to 
fall is unclear, but it could be significant and long lasting.” 
 
Currently, as mentioned, Spain is facing many imbalances in form of fiscal deficits/debt, ex-
ternal deficit/debt, high household and corporate debt/borrowing, the oversize construction 
sector and low private savings. Among these imbalances, excessive weight of residential real 
estate in GDP, rapid expansion of credit and leverage in the private sector and current account 
deficit are the most exposed ones.
82
  
 
Compared to other countries in the euro area, Spain is facing relatively high household debt 
and, particularly, corporate debt since the boom. Ireland is the only country in the EU, which 
has a level of corporate debt that exceeds the Spanish one. “Spain’s household debt to income 
ratio has also significantly diverged from the average of the euro area since 2001.”83  
 
“The construction and real estate sectors are large, highly leveraged and rely more on bank 
financing than in other countries.”84 The increased lending to construction and the real estate 
activities as well as to the strong co-movement of housing prices and credit shows that “hous-
ing and leverage have been moving in tandem”.85  
 
Between 2004 and 2008, “construction explained 8 percent of private sector credit growth, 
real estate activities 22 percent, and the acquisition of real estate (mortgages) 33 percent”. 
This boom in housing is the main element responsible for the increase in the corporate sector 
indebtedness.
86
 In 2006, more than 20 per cent of the Spanish labour force was working in the 
construction sector.
87
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“Spain differs from other countries with significant house price appreciation in that it has 
seen not only a house price 
boom but a construction boom 
as well.” Due to this, Spain 
has suffered from a payoff in 
terms of productivity and a de-
crease in total factor produc-
tivity. Besides, “a legacy of 
stocks”, housing units, unem-
ployment and debt, have been 
left and the trade balance has 
been affected negatively.
88
  
 
Consequently, the housing boom has made the Spanish household suffer from concentrated 
debt burdens. Eighty per cent of the Spanish households’ debt is largely concentrated in mort-
gages. “Still, those households who have debt tend to be more leveraged.” With “a high pro-
portion of the young liv-
ing with their parents 
and a high youth unem-
ployment rate”, the in-
cidence “of mortgages 
and the median debt to 
income ratio among the 
young” compared to 
other countries is sur-
prisingly high in Spa-
in.
89
 
 
Until the second half of 2008, the euro area average of households’ gross saving rate had been 
above the Spanish one for a long time. When the crisis started, the Spanish household’s gross 
saving rate increased to above the euro area average but in early 2010, “the ratio fell sharply 
back to below the euro area average” again. This change has been the sharpest among the 
euro area countries.
90
 
 
From a historical perspective, credit per capita is today below the trend.
91
 “Credit to the 
construction sector is falling significantly, but not credit to the real estate sector.” It is 
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estimated that credit to the private sector will continue falling. To stop this evolution it is of 
importance:   
- to ensure “that the ongoing financial sector reform promptly delivers the needed 
“cleansing”, especially in fully recognizing losses in the real estate sector”, 
- to avoid “a situation of “zombie lending” (to real estate activities) and delayed 
adjustment”,  
- to reallocate “credit towards the more productive and innovative sectors of the eco-
nomy, which “might require more decisive action to resolve unviable real estate deve-
lopers and shrink the size of sector”, and 
- to continue “the reform of the housing market with the primary purpose of allowing 
the market to clear, either through enhanced price discovery or through greater deve-
lopment of the rental market”.92,93 
 
Average interest rates on home loans have decreased sharply from around 6.25 per cent in 
July 2008 to around 2.5 per cent in December 2010. On the other hand, the average interest 
rates on consumer loans have only decreased from around 11 – 12 per cent in July 2008 to 
around 10 per cent in December 2010.
94
    
 
3.1.3.4 The Service Sector  
In the tertiary sector, services stand for 60 per cent of all employment in Spain and since 
1985, it has continued increasing. Exporting tourism services is among Spain’s specializations 
and other service sectors of importance are, for example, real estate and business services, 
wholesale and retail trade and health care as well as transport and communication.
95
   
 
Spain is specifying on traditional, lower productivity and lower technological levels also with-
in services, a sector, which often is subjected to high inflation. While wages rise, the produc-
tivity grows less than the industry. To keep the service profit margin, it is necessary for the 
employers to increase prices and give the service sector strong inflationary pressures over the 
rest of the economy. Spain is in need of specializing in higher value-added services.
96
          
 
3.1.4 The Labour Market and Financial Resources  
3.1.4.1 The Labour Market  
In 1964-1974, the outward migration that occurred led to a low unemployment rate for Spain. 
Thereafter, during 1975-1984, started a period of massive unemployment due to massive de-
struction of jobs. The decrease in employment during the end of the 1970s and the beginning 
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of the 1980s can partly be 
explained by the destruction of 
2 million jobs, the oil crisis, 
political transition instability 
and a structural weakness of the 
economy. Why just Spain suf-
fered so much can be due to 
that Spain was one of the 
countries with lowest activity 
rates in the OECD, the legali-
zation of temporary contracts in 
Spain in 1984 and a mismatch between educational level and job characteristics. The 
following decade, when there was creation of jobs but also destruction as well as an increase 
in active population, the unemployment rate remained high. The increase in active population 
was due to an increase in the rate of female participation in the 1980s. Furthermore, the unem-
ployment rate started decreasing after the crisis in 1995, due to the creation of many new jobs. 
Before the international crisis and the euro debt Spain faced its highest level of 
unemployment in 1994.
97
 In 2008, Spain reached its highest level of employment rate of 
women, 55.7 per cent of the female population between 15 and 64 years old. The OECD-
Total was 57.6 per cent. Last year, the same number was 52.8 per cent for Spain and 56.7 per 
cent for the OECD-Total.
98
    
 
There have always been significant and persistent regional differences in Spain. The unem-
ployment rate has always been higher in the south than in the north. One explanation may be 
that the regional economic activity influences the weak migration and regional labour mar-
kets.
99
 
 
In 2007, there was a high number of temporary jobs, 32 per cent, which caused problems even 
though the number of unemployed 
was not too high. Since the on-going 
crisis started, Spain’s unemployment 
rate has increased sharply by 16.3 
percentage points, to 24.2 per cent 
(estimate), which is the highest ever 
and shows that Spain has fallen back 
into recession.
100
  
    
                                                 
97
 Lectures in Spanish Economy. 
98
 OECD iLibrary, Employment Rate of Women. 
99
 Ibid. 
100
 BBC, Spanish unemployment hits record 5.64 million. 
GDP and employment in Spain, 1985 - 2010 
Unemployment rate in Spain, 2002 – 2012, IMF 
- 24 - 
 
After the labour market has been reformed, it will be both easier and cheaper for companies to 
fire employees.
101
 Besides, the “natural”102 rate of unemployment in Spain is much higher 
than in other European countries due to Spain’s rigidities of its labour market and since the 
economic crisis started Spain has doubled its natural unemployment rate.
103
  
 
Currently, the average employee in the private sector is working 38.5 hours per week at the 
same time as public employees only work until the early afternoon. In the future, public 
employees in Spain may have to work as many hours as those working for the private sector. 
“By closing the gap between the working hours of the private and public sector” the govern-
ment hopes that the employees’ salaries as well as public efficiency will increase.104 The 
average annual working time in Spain was 1690 hours per worker in 2011. In the OECD-
Total the same number was 1776 hours per worker.
105
 
 
3.1.4.2 The Financial System 
Since the mid-1980s, the number of banks in Spain has increased, while the number of Cajas, 
saving banks, and Cooperatives has decreased. Between 1986 and 2003, the cooperatives had 
the highest profitability. Additionally, the Cajas did not fluctuate much in profitability. The 
Cajas got most badly affected from the crisis and their profitability has declined heavily since 
2007.
106
  
 
The Spanish banking system is currently facing many difficulties. Bankia is Spain’s third 
largest bank and resulted from a merger of a number of debt-ridden saving banks.
107
 Probably, 
Bankia will need 19 billion euros 
in capital to solve its current situa-
tion.
108
 “The restructuring of the 
Spanish financial sector is focused 
on the savings banks, because 
some of these institutions were 
subject to a series of weaknesses 
accumulated during the prolonged 
period of growth of the Spanish 
economy.
”109
 Both during the crisis 
in 1993 and today’s crisis, Spain 
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has had lower doubtful loans ratios of credit for house purchase, but today’s crisis’ numbers 
are worse.
110
  
 
“With the unprecedented deepening of the country's housing crisis, Cajas are known to have 
delayed the registering of bad loans, especially those backed by houses and land, to avoid 
declaring losses. This has occurred despite the fact that these credits are backed by the bor-
rower's present and future assets.”111 
 
The leverage ratio of the Spanish banking system; assets/capital and reserves, is low compa-
red to current financially “strong” countries such as Germany and Belgium and in September 
2011, it was equal to fully ten per cent. The same ratio in Germany was 22 per cent, in Belgi-
um 21 per cent and in the EMU fully 15 per cent.
112
          
 
According to IMF, Spain’s national debt, between 2002 and 2007, has been less than 395 bil-
lion euros. Since the on-going 
crisis started, it has increased 
heavily. In 2012, the national debt 
was as high as 839.95 billion 
euros. National debt in relation to 
GDP has increased from 36.30 
per cent in 2007 to 79.04 per cent 
(estimate) in 2012.   
 
The total external debt of Spain 
was at the end of March 2012 
1 779 973 million euros or twice the national debt.
113
 The share of external debt issued in 
euros is higher than 96 per cent.
114
 In case Spain would have to leave the EMU, the 
probability is high that the pesetas would be weak compared to the euro, which would make it 
more costly for Spain to repay their external debt.  
 
Standard and Poor’s has lowered Spain’s credit rating, which will rise the borrowing costs for 
the already financially pressed country, and warned of risks to come.
115
 Besides, Spain got 
placed on “negative outlook”, which means that there is a risk that Spain will be further 
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downgraded.
116
 Spain’s rating is now BBB+ and to support its banking system, Spain may not 
have any other choice than “to take on more debt”.117 
 
The yield on 10-year bonds has recently risen, which indicates that “investors have become 
more wary of Spain’s ability to repay its debts”.118      
 
3.1.5 The Public Sector, Macroeconomic Policies and Distribution of Income  
3.1.5.1 The Public Sector
119  
In 2009, the Spanish government’s ex-
penditures amounted to about 46 per cent 
of GDP, which was almost the same as 
the OECD average at that time.  Before 
that, between 2002 and 2007, Spain had 
balancing budgets or was operating at a 
surplus. Just after the crisis, revenues 
started falling at the same time as expen-
ditures remained constant, which resulted 
in a sharp increase in deficit. Regional 
governments account for 35.7 per cent of Spain’s spending while central governments only 
account for 20.8 per cent. This shows that Spain’s government expenditures are greatly 
decentralized. The government expenditures are going to be reduced by 16.9 per cent, 27.3 
billion euros.
120
  
 
Between 1995 and 2007, Spain expe-
rienced a steady growth in public re-
venues. Before the revenues started 
declining in 2007, they reached the 
level 40 per cent of GDP. Less than 
half of Spain’s central government re-
venues are provided by the personal 
income tax, which has remained more 
or less constant over time. The cor-
porate income tax as well as the glo-
bally considered consumption tax have also remained constant over time while the excise tax-
es have declined with a growth in value added tax. In 2009, tax revenues fell by over 29.4 
million euros, a 17-point decrease over the previous year, due to among other things stimulus 
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measures and support for liquidity, residual effects of income and corporation tax reforms and 
downturns in employment and real GDP along with price reductions.    
 
The tax on electricity and gas has been increased by 7 per cent but the government has chosen 
not to change the pensions and compensation from the 
unemployment insurance fund. The value-added tax 
will also remain intact. Besides, the company tax will 
be raised and the government would also like to im-
plement a tax amnesty to increase the future tax re-
venues.
121
    
 
Pension reforms, which will reduce pension expendi-
ture, have been discussed. The expenditures will in-
crease heavily if no reforms will be implemented.
122
      
 
Since 1993, Spain has only had public surpluses three times, namely 2005, 2006 and 2007, 
which is more times than in the EMU. The highest deficit, 11 per cent of GDP, was reached in 
2009. Moreover, last year's budget deficit landed at 8.5 per cent of GDP. Under pressure from 
the EU, the government have decided to cut the deficit to 5.3 per cent this year and after furt-
her cut downs the budget deficit is to 
be three per cent in 2013.
123
 
 
The national debt in Spain has always 
been lower than in the EMU. In 2007, 
the national debt in Spain was 36.2 
per cent of GDP. Last year it reached 
68.5 per cent of GDP, higher than in 
1996.
124
 Most of Spain’s regions have 
large debts and are drawn with large 
deficits in their regional budgets. For 
example, Catalonia, which accounts 
for as much as 20 per cent of the 
Spanish economy, has more than 13 
billion euros in debt maturing this 
year.
125
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3.1.5.2 Inflation 
The average inflation rate in Spain between 
2002 and 2012 has been 2.78 per cent. In 
April 2012, the inflation rate in Spain reached 
2.1 per cent.
126
 Furthermore, in 2008, the in-
flation rate was as high as 4.1 per cent, the 
highest since 1995, and in July 2009, the in-
flation rate was as low as -0.3 per cent, in 
other words deflation occurred.
127
    
 
3.1.5.3 Distribution of Income 
In 2005, 19.7 per cent of the Spanish population had an income below 60 per cent of the me-
dian income distribution, while in 2009 only 19.5 per cent. Spain’s poverty rate has always 
been higher than for the EU-27, which counted for 16.4 per cent in 2005 and 16.3 per cent in 
2009.  The inequality ratio between the 20 per cent richest and the 20 per cent poorest of the 
Spanish population has increased with 0.6 percentage points between 2005 and 2009.
128
 
 
3.1.6 The Foreign Sector 
3.1.6.1 Balance of Payments 
For the first quarter of 2012, Spain’s balance of payments accounted to a current account defi-
cit of 14 849.7 million euros and a capital account surplus of 630.3 million euros. In total the 
current and capital account accounted to a deficit of 14 219.5 million euros.
129
 Moreover, the 
financial account was equivalent to a surplus of 8 481.4 million euros.   
 
Regarding inflows and outflows of capital, 
Spain has always had more inflows than 
outflows. Since the 1980s, the difference 
between inflows and outflows has never 
been bigger than during the 2008 - 2010 
period but the percentage rate of inflows 
and outflows were though higher during the 
1999 - 2007 era. Between 1993 and 1998 
inflows and outflows were almost equal. 
After the first three months of 2012, the net 
outflow of capital amounted to 97.090 mil-
lion euros due to among other things the flight of portfolio investment, loans and deposits. 
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This result was a drastic change from the same period of 2011 when there was a net inflow 
equal to 20.887 million euros.
130
    
 
Spain is among those three countries receiving most money in form of grants and support 
from the EU. In 2010, Spain received net flows of capital of 3 billion euros from the EU, a de-
crease of about 11.4 billion euros since 2005.
131
  
 
By tradition, “Spain’s trade deficit has been partially offset by surpluses in other external 
balances, partially service trade, as a result of large net tourism inflows, but since 2005, the 
current account deficit has been as large as the trade deficit.”132 Between 1961 and 2000, the 
current account balance each 
year has approximately landed 
in the range of a surplus of 2 per 
cent of GDP and a deficit of 4 
per cent of GDP. In 2007, the 
deficit was as high as almost 10 
per cent of GDP. Thereafter the 
deficit has declined. Spain’s cur-
rent account deficit in August 
2011 was equivalent to 1.45 bil-
lion euros.
133
  
 
Spain is ranked as the 36
th
 most competitive country and today Spain’s economic competitive 
rating is equal to 4.54, which is described as high.
134
 “High private debt and weak external 
competitiveness cause long adjustments. Spain cannot devalue the currency to bolster compe-
titiveness, so reforms that cut costs and improve productivity are of key importance.”135 Spain 
is competitive in the pharmaceutical industry and companies specializing in international in-
frastructure.
136
 
  
When entering the European Monetary Union, the exchange rate of the peseta, was too high. 
Since the monetary policy in Spain mainly focused on controlling the supply of money to the 
market from the Bank of Spain, it was impossible to reduce the external deficit and 
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expenditure due to that interest rates had increased and attracted external investments. As a 
result, there were three devaluations of the peseta between 1992 and 1993.
137
 
 
3.1.6.2 External Trade 
The world economy has become increasingly interconnected. Since 1966 Spain has always 
laid a higher percentage of its GDP on imports than on exports. Besides, after 1995, both the 
percentage of exports and imports increased but after the international crisis there was a small 
decline.  Spain has lately experienced an increase in export by around 10 per cent.
138
 
 
In 2009, EU stood for 58.3 per cent of 
Spain’s imports and 68.9 per cent of 
Spain’s exports. France and Germany 
have become Spain’s most important 
trading partners. Among Spain’s major 
exports you can find wine, machinery, 
motor vehicles and foodstuffs. Major 
imports are machinery and equipment, 
fuels, chemicals, foodstuffs and consu-
mer goods.
139
   
 
3.1.6.3 Foreign Direct Investment  
Last year, Spain increased its revenue of foreign direct investment by 18.4 per cent, which 
was equal to 28 415 million euros. Investment in productive partnerships accounted for 79.1 
per cent, instead of for 59.4 per cent as in 2010.
140
  
 
United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands are the three top investors in Spain while Mad-
rid and Catalonia are the two regions, which received most of the inflows of foreign invest-
ment. Besides, telecommunications, passenger’s air transport and other monetary intermed-
iaries-banking were among those main sectors receiving inflows of foreign investment.   
   
In 2011, Spain’s investment abroad, mostly in productive partnerships, accounted for 30 611 
million euros, a decrease of 21.9 per cent since 2010. “Investments in companies holding 
foreign securities fell by 49.6%.” Turkey, Poland, United Kingdom, Brazil and the United 
States amounted for 73.6 per cent of the investments among the receiving countries.
141
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4 Capitalism 4.0 
The main purpose of Capitalism 4.0 is to develop an economic model that will be better-off 
than the last one due to new technology, globalization and social changes opportunities.  An 
important task will be to understand “that governments and markets can both be wrong and 
that sometimes their errors can be near-fatal” as well as that the world we are living in “is 
too unpredictable and complex to be managed by any immutable institutional structure”. That 
fact implies that business and politics can collaborate and “it creates scope for leadership, 
creativity and experimentation” in both areas.142 “If markets and political institutions are both 
recognized as fallible, the rational response must be a willingness to experiment and a prefe-
rence for reversible policies and business decisions, initially conducted at a modest scale and 
in a decentralized way.”143  
 
Furthermore, Capitalism 4.0 is taking the private economy and the government into a closer 
relationship. It is known that governments and markets make mistakes due to complexness 
and unpredictability. “The ability to operate by trial and error, to correct mistakes before 
they do too much social harm, is the greatest virtue of the market system.” Banking crisis and 
financial cycles are likely and returning features of any market system. In the future, “govern-
ments and central banks will have to take greater responsibility for managing growth and em-
ployment”. Additionally, they will have to focus on preserving financial stability.  
 
Even though the government will get greater responsibilities and influence, its size will start 
decreasing. The economy will be in need of more private financing and “education is likely to 
become more market-driven”.144 Just after the crisis, politicians and central bankers realized 
that they could, for instance, keep zero interest rates for long time periods, that public 
spending could be directed toward infrastructure and job creation and that export-led growth 
could be promoted by managing exchange rates. Thus, they understood they had “powerful 
tools at their disposal to boost economic growth”.145 It is important to keep in mind “that 
capitalism is prone to crisis, clouded by uncertainties, and dependent on government support 
for its survival”.146  
 
Most likely, currency crisis, monetary inflation and rising interest rates will be easier to hand-
le during the fourth stage of capitalism than during earlier stages.
147
 As soon as politicians and 
voters understand that an interaction between every aspect of policy is unavoidable, economic 
objectives will be managed in a more complex way. “The polarized dichotomies between the 
monetary and the real economy, between responsibilities for inflation and unemployment, 
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between the aims of macroeconomics and microeconomics, will no longer make sense.” Cent-
ral banks will be obliged to aim at numerous targets at the same time. Even governments “will 
have to accept much wider responsibilities”; growth has to be balanced internationally. Thus, 
under Capitalism 4.0 more effort will be put on greater complexity, broader political responsi-
bility and tighter constraints.
148
  
 
One already existing macroeconomic worry for the fourth phase “is the outlook for inflation… 
in the second half of the new decade”.149 Besides, a more competitive education with private 
provision will be a result of the declining boundaries between the government and the mar-
ket.
150
 When dealing with goals of taxation, there must be greater distinctions between reve-
nue raising and redistribution in the new phase. Capitalism 4.0 will ask for an improved eco-
nomic stability, which can be achieved by new financial systems, “without sacrificing the 
main benefits of financial freedom and innovation”.  
 
To achieve with the complex trade-offs that the fourth stage of capitalism will need, reforms 
will have to please the following ten principles:
151
  
1. “Regulations must try to preserve financial flexibility and innovation at the same time as 
improving economic stability.” Instead of as in Capitalism 3, Capitalism 4.0 recognizes “that 
these two desirable objectives are in conflict”.152 
2. “Even banks that are not "too big to fail" will sometimes be “too important to fail.” It is of 
importance that “public policy should recognize this explicitly”. Governments should, under 
certain conditions, support, through various insurance and dependent capital arrangements, all 
financial institutions and be convinced that this taxpayer support will be paid by the banks.
153
 
3. Since markets are recognized to be frequently wrong, policymakers “must be willing to 
regulate financial institutions”. This has to be done “even without any evidence of particular 
market failures”.154  
4. A clear distinction between risky and safe obligations should be required from the banks in 
advance. Thus, the banks' creditors and investors should know, which obligations “are 100 
per cent safe”, thereby "guaranteed firstly by the bank's own capital and liquidity and ultima-
tely backed by the government”.155 
5. “Banks and financial institutions must enjoy far greater leeway in their accounting rules 
and disclosure requirements than other businesses. Banks must be allowed to exercise their 
judgment, under the supervision of regulators, in assessing the long-term value of their loans, 
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mortgages and other assets and they must be allowed to smooth out their profits over long 
periods.”156  
6. Judgments about the quality of bank assets and lending must be done by regulators and 
politicians since the risk management of banks is too essential to be outsourced.
157
  
7. “A new division of labor is essential between private and public mortgage operations.”158  
8. Taxpayers should be given interests “represented alongside the interests of shareholders”, 
as long as they “are effectively partners in the banks”.159 
9. Regulators will continue taking “an interest in bankers' bonuses and earnings” as long as 
it will be a legitimate reason to protect taxpayers in banking businesses.
160
      
10. Great profits for the banks do not always come along with highly rewarded financial 
geniuses.
161
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5 A Theoretical Analysis 
5.1 Spain during the Different Phases 
5.1.1 Capitalism 1 
The late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries’ political instability in Spain proves that Spain was part 
of the social and economic upheaval that defines the first phase of capitalism. The mentioned 
upheaval resulted in a dictatorship where the dictator’s leadership was unrestricted by law, 
constitutions and other social and political factors within the state. This shows further eviden-
ce of compliance with Capitalism 1.  
 
5.1.2 Capitalism 2 
General Franco influenced Spain during the second phase of capitalism, with, as mentioned, 
his extreme form of isolationism and self-sufficiency, which Spain was forced into. After the 
Spanish Civil War and by the end of World War II, Spain got diplomatically and politically 
isolated. The first period of the second phase, with poverty and strictly limited imports, was 
harder for Spain than for most other European countries. The isolation toward the rest of 
Western Europe largely existed until Franco’s death but was less strict after 1960 when Spain 
experienced a delayed fast economic growth due to its many structural changes. Due to that 
Spain was a dictatorship, the country stood out from Kaletsky’s theories. The Spanish govern-
ment was strictly controlled and could not govern for the population’s best and manage the 
economy, and was therefore inefficient. Thus, Spain was not typical for the second phase of 
capitalism regarding the positive attitude towards governments. Besides, due to Franco’s re-
gime and the blockade during the 1950s Spain had no chance to trust the markets.  
 
At the end of Capitalism 2, Spain, as most European countries, suffered from high inflation 
and an increasing unemployment rate, thus stagflation, due to among other things a new 
blockade. Additionally, the economic crisis and divergence with Europe affected Spain nega-
tively. It is important to stress that the reasons why just Spain was so badly affected were the 
country’s low activity rates, deficient legislation and the bad matching of educational level 
and job characteristics.       
 
5.1.3 Capitalism 3 
After General Franco’s death in 1975, Spain became a democracy. Thereafter, Capitalism 3 
started with an economic boom, especially with growth in labour productivity and thus a 
rapidly reduced unemployment rate. The lack of flexibility in the capital and labour market 
had before given Spain one of Europe’s highest unemployment rates. Besides, openness in the 
economy was a fact. The openness in the economy as well as the fall of the dictatorship led to 
that Spain could start trusting the markets more. In contrast to Kaletsky’s theories, the trust 
for the government started rising at the same time. The closer the end of the third stage, the 
more distrust for the government arose.  
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Spain was part of the currency crisis during the beginning of the 1990s but since Spain was 
not one among those countries, which adopted the free-market most willingly, Spain was not 
that badly affected. The development toward the EMU helped Spain move forward in the 
mid-1990s.   
 
Also, the period between mid-1990s and 2007 is characterized by macroeconomic stability, 
reduced unemployment rates, decreased interest rates as well as increased housing prices and 
investment.    
 
5.2 Questions to Be Answered 
5.2.1 Has the Spanish Economy Been Typical for Each Phase of Capitalism? 
Despite that Capitalism 1 only has been dealt with shortly, I would say that Spain more or less 
has followed Kaletsky’s theories regarding that phase.  
 
When analysing Capitalism 2, Spain has partially followed Kaletsky’s theories. The markets 
were distrusted but, at the same time, no faith in the government existed due to the regime and 
the periodic isolation.  
 
During the phase Capitalism 3, Spain deviated from Kaletsky’s ideas in the beginning of the 
phase, due to the regime change, but as the years passed, Spain’s situation became more and 
more in line with Kaletsky’s theories.  
 
5.2.2 Would Spain Have Succeeded Better if Keynes’ and Friedman’s Theories 
Would Have Been Applied during the Last Decade/Decades?  
Spain did not fully take part of the Golden Age of Keynesian economics. During some time 
living standards were low, technological progress not as fast as in competing countries and 
there have been periods with lack of financial stability.  
 
Due to Franco’s regime and the long-lasting isolation, the Spanish government has not been 
able to follow Keynes guidelines regarding how to act like a well-functioning government. 
The Spanish government has, for example, not had the power to boost spending when neces-
sary and to create an active employment policy in time. This was possible first after becoming 
a democracy. Fiscal and monetary measures are, as mentioned, essential in order to ease ad-
verse effects of economic recessions and depressions.     
 
When studying the figures showing the public deficit/surplus in Spain during the last decade/ 
decades you can more or less say that Spain has followed Keynes’ strategy and shifted policy 
in boom and recession. For example, in the boom of the 1960s as well as of the early 21
st
 
century, Spain created a budget surplus and in compliances with the recession of the begin-
ning of the 1990s, Spain experienced a budget deficit.   
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Also, for example, after 1960, when Spain experienced better living conditions, faster growth 
and lower unemployment rates, the country made a mistake according to Keynes. Spain 
should have invested more since high rates of investment during a period of optimism incre-
ase the amount of capital in the economy. Furthermore, an increase in investment lowers the 
number of job losses and increases incomes as well as consumption.   
 
Moreover, the lack of efficiency and flexibility as well as the delay in growth in productivity 
have led to an insufficient aggregated demand, which according to Keynes can be one 
explanation for a high unemployment rate and lead to a financial crisis.  
 
Keynes' statement that "governments should spend money they don't have may have saved 
capitalism."
162
 If Spain would have taken a greater part of the Golden Age of Keynesian eco-
nomics, there is a chance Spain’s situation would not have been as severe as it is today. The 
delay that the Franco era and the isolation contributed to has set its marks on Spain’s develop-
ment. 
 
In connection with the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, policy makers and 
academics in the world’s industrialized economies sought “a resurgence of interest in Key-
nesian economics”. “Discussions and implementations of economic policies in accordance 
with recommendations”, made by Keynes, “in response to the Great Depression, such as 
fiscal stimulus and expansionary monetary policy” have become of interest again.163     
 
Thus, it is possible that Spain would have succeeded better
164
 if Spain would have applied 
more of Keynes’ theories during the last decade/decades.  
 
Spain applied Friedman’s theories more willingly than Keynes’.  To limit the high inflation, 
which occurred in the beginning of the 1980s, and to bring it under control, economic activity 
was reduced, which is a pattern in Friedman’s theories. In 2008 though, this pattern was not 
applied, as growth in the money supply was not restricted.    
 
When examining Spain in a monetarist perspective, the inflation has not in all times been 
stable, see, for example, the beginning of the 21
st
 century and in compliance with the crisis. If 
the Spanish government would have kept the amount of money in circulation under control, 
the inflation may have followed a more smooth evolution. In addition, the fact that Spain has 
a high natural/structural unemployment rate is natural according to monetarists like Friedman. 
In the long-run, the government cannot affect it but in the short-run, it is dependent on expec-
tations.    
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During the years just before the financial crisis in 2008 started, Spain followed Friedman’s 
theories about a free market economic system with as little government intervention as pos-
sible. For example, in 2006, it is suggested that Spain’s “households were far richer, even 
after taking into account all their borrowing, than ever before in history”. “Their wealth was 
much higher in relation to their incomes”, thus “they were more solvent than ever before and 
more capable of carrying their debts”. In all cases, the growth of debt during the boom period 
was smaller than the increase in wealth.
165
 A flourishing period like the one just mentioned 
cannot last forever and when the amount of money in circulation in the economy at one point 
became too high and the crisis started, the Spanish economy turned into an upheaval. These 
facts can be a result of letting the markets run “free” and if the markets would have been 
better controlled, the situation Spain is in today may have been less problematic.  
 
Thus, it is possible that Spain would have succeeded better if Spain would have applied more 
of Friedman’s theories regarding controlling the money in circulation but less of Friedman’s 
theories regarding letting the market run “free” during the last decade/decades.   
  
5.2.3 Is Spain in Need of Something New? Capitalism 4.0? 
The last years’ increase in unemployment and the weakening of government finances have 
been sharper for Spain than for other advanced OECD economies in terms of real GDP. The 
construction sector has been permanently downsized at the same time as the private sector’s 
debt burden is still high, which in the future will decrease economic growth. For Spain to start 
flourishing again, a new reform of the pension system is of importance to ensure the long term 
sustainability of public finances and to guarantee benefits of retirement in 20 years.
166
 
  
During the crisis, half of the people who became unemployed in the euro area were Spanish. 
If the unemployed would get the possibility to start working again, Spain’s economic recove-
ry would strengthen again, social well-being would be improved and poverty would decrease. 
In the long-run, a lower unemployment would improve the government finances. Thanks to 
new labour market reforms after the crisis, the amount of permanent contracts have been redu-
ced as well as it is now easier for companies to set their wages according to their economic 
conditions.  Consequently, the unemployed must get better help from public employment ser-
vices when looking for jobs. Particularly vulnerable are young workers, where the unemploy-
ment level is as high as 46 per cent.
167
  
 
To solve the crisis, “education is the ultimate solution to prevent the intergenerational persis-
tence of unemployment”. Those without full secondary education are especially affected of 
youth unemployment. One solution can be to make more attractive and relevant courses, 
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which can be used in local businesses and labour markets and to link higher education and 
businesses. Among those Spanish students between 25 and 29 years old, who graduate from 
university, 44 per cent have low skilled works. The OECD average is 23 per cent.
168
  
 
According to OECD, comprehensive structural reforms have to be carried out in education, 
innovation and increased competition as well as it is vital to increase employment, reduce 
inequalities and protect the weakest in society. Consequently, to increase growth, fiscal aus-
terity measures have to go hand in hand with structural measures. At the same time, it is ex-
tremely important to find a balance between saving measures and revenue growth in each co-
untry’s budget.169    
 
Also, the creation of firms needs to be supported as well as the innovative capacity of the 
economy need to be boosted. Spain has become unproductive due to lack of flexibility, 
innovation and focus on sectors, which only contribute with little value to the rest of the 
economy.
170
  A new, better regulation, which can help strengthening competitiveness of 
business abroad, is vital.
171
  
 
The foreign exchange market and the banking sector are linked together. Therefore, a crisis in 
the foreign exchange market often comes together with a crisis in the banking sector, in this 
case within the euro zone.
172
 “The reason is that the lender of last resort function of the do-
mestic central bank is very much impaired when banks expand the foreign currency compone-
nts of their balance sheets.”173 One explanation for the severe banking crisis that occurred in 
2007-08 is the absence of a centralized supervision of the banking system. Therefore, political 
integration needs to develop further and necessary institutional changes need to be done as 
soon as possible within the euro zone.
174
 
 
The European Central Bank has the responsibility to keep inflation low. Consequently, the 
expansion should have caused a warning for the European Central Bank of a future financial 
crisis. Even though the European Central Bank’s “focus on inflation prevented it from taking 
action aimed at checking the ballooning expansion of bank credit”, the main responsibility of 
the financial crisis “is to be found in the failure of bank supervision” as well as in the remain-
ing of nationally organized regulation. In addition, the euro system has to reform the supervis-
ory authority to an European level. Other critics mean that the absence of an obligation for the 
European Central Bank to, in excess of controlling inflation, also control unemployment rates 
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is a further explanation for the current euro crisis. In comparison, the Federal Reserve has 
such an obligation.
175
     
 
Not to be forgotten, Spain’s economy is deeply internationalized and it has leading multina-
tional companies as well as the world’s second most spoken language.176 Nations with great 
losses in their competitiveness are the ones which got most badly affected by the crisis.
177
  
 
Spain is one of the countries which support “green industries” and means it is compatible with 
growth.  Sustainable use of scarce natural resources is required for sustainable economic 
growth. Fresh water is a scarce resource in many of Spain’s regions. “Making sure that prices 
for water use reflect cost adequately can help mobilise private sector funding to upgrade 
water infrastructure, providing some stimulus for investment, as well as water savings.”178  
 
Scientists, who study how ecosystems in nature work, mean that the single currency has incre-
ased the individual members’ dependence on each other, at the same time, as each member is 
still capable of acting independently from their own financial situation. When this happens in 
nature, key members expose the entire network for a risk, which often leads to eradication or 
complete collapse. An economic network must break the interdependence, increase regulation 
or loose members. Problems arise when certain parts of the system are independent and others 
not. Systems based on both cooperation and competition are vulnerable and nature is good to 
learn from.
179
 
 
Capitalism 4.0 could be an alternative for Spain. When examining the ten principles, which 
are necessary for achieving the complex trade-offs that the fourth stage of capitalism will re-
quire, it will be necessary to work on all points for Spain. Especially, the part about taking the 
private economy and the government into a closer relationship is essential for Spain. Mistakes 
must be corrected before they cause too much social harm and a greater responsibility has to 
be taken for managing growth and employment. An accelerating private financing as well as a 
change in education would as already discussed also improve Spain’s situation.       
 
After studying the statistics on Spain, Spain can overall be said to, currently, facing many dif-
ficulties. For instance, since the crisis started, Spain has experienced slow growth, low pro-
ductivity, a fall in housing prices and an increase in the corporate indebtedness, decreased 
interest rates, high unemployment rates, high national deficit and debt and so on. By applying 
Capitalism 4.0 and giving both the government and the market a chance to correct today’s 
problems, Spain can start working on improving the above mentioned struggles. It will also be 
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important for Spain to divide and accept much wider responsibilities between different actors. 
In the future, collaborations between businesses and politics should not be something rare. 
Spain will have to enact more regulations as well as act more internationally. Also, interna-
tional organisations must be reformed so that they can meet the new challenges of globaliza-
tion at the same time as they need to be developed so that they can gain greater legitimacy.
180
        
 
5.2.4 Contributions from Other Theories 
Spain should in the future also try to apply Bernanke’s doctrine, thus preventing fraud and 
abusive lending and ensuring that lenders employ sound underwriting practices as well as 
making effective disclosures to consumers and putting more power on preserving price stabi-
lity. Currently, though, Spain’s high inflation in 2008 and deflation in 2009 have been 
replaced by inflation around the preferred level of 2 per cent.  
 
According to Fisher’s theories, the Spanish economy has become short-circuited in conjunc-
tion with crisis over time. When prices have started falling, real debt has started increasing.    
 
When applying Mishkin’s five lessons on Spain, you can among other things draw the follow-
ing conclusions. Today’s economic situation in Spain has become more acute than anyone 
could ever imagine. The statistics on Spain have varied wildly during the last decades and it is 
impossible to see a linear trend. Regarding the different types of costs, Spain has experienced 
all of them. For example, after the crisis aggregate output has declined, growth has slowed 
down and the government’s budgets have deteriorated drastically. Besides, the confidence in 
the European Central Bank has been reduced. The fact that Spain, for instance, experienced 
budget surpluses three years in a row just before the economic crisis started in 2007 did not 
ensure a future financial stability for Spain. What is more, as mentioned, some rethinking is 
necessary regarding the basic framework for monetary policy strategy and more effort has to 
be put on monetary policy.           
 
The theories of Reinhart, Rogoff and Kaminsky give an overall understanding of economic 
crisis but their theories are not fully applicable on Spain. One essential contribution to why 
the economic situation in Spain has become so severe has to do with the fact that Spain is 
facing more than one crisis at the same time, both a currency and a banking crisis. Besides, 
the real estate bubble in Spain became a deeply problematic one. One reason, as explained, is 
the fact that Spain imported capital from abroad, which boomed the economy and led to that 
Spain could not keep track of realistic values.    
 
Wihlborg talks more generally about the euro area and an optimal currency area than about 
Spain in particular during his lesson but his talk gives a deeper insight into the EMU matter. 
When a country has its own currency, the need to keep pace with other countries in terms of 
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productivity is not as big as when countries have a common currency. When the euro was 
introduced in Spain, the labour costs per unit increased and production in Spain has become 
one third more expensive. The gap between high and low performing countries is increasing 
year by year.
181
 One important argument Wihlborg mentions has to do with insolvent banks. 
By closing insolvent banks, Spain can more easily get out from the current credit crunch 
situation but to make this happen there is a need of new regimes.  
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6 Conclusion 
To understand the situation Spain is facing today, it is important to take into consideration the 
delay in the Spanish economic development caused by to Franco’s regime and the isolation 
Spain was exposed to decades ago. Besides, the regional autonomy and the regional 
differences have caused and cause problems for Spain. The last decades’ climate changes 
have affected Spain more drastically than most other European countries. Low productivity, 
low efficiency, low flexibility and low skills of the workforce as well as lack of 
competitiveness in foreign trade are other weaknesses with historical backgrounds.  
 
Since the beginning of the 1970, Spain has undergone a higher number of social changes than 
any other Western European country. Not only today but also historically has Spain had one 
of the highest unemployment and natural unemployment rates in Europe. The delay in the 
economic development and the fact that Spain has spent less on R&D and innovation than 
other European Union countries have caused and cause difficulties for Spain.  
 
In 2007, the national debt in relation to domestic product was as low as 36.30 per cent and far 
from the 60 per cent roof. From 2005 to 2007 the national deficit was positive. At this time, 
Spain did not only face a house price boom but also a construction boom. When these booms 
stopped abruptly in 2008, major building projects remained half-finished and housing prices 
started falling drastically. This is the main reason for the economic crisis in Spain and expla-
ins to a big extent the extremely fast increase of the unemployment rate in Spain, the huge 
corporate sector indebtedness and the severe banking crisis. For instance, the national debt in 
2012 is expected to reach the level of 79.04 per cent and the national deficit 5.3 per cent.     
 
A high unemployment rate has been a returning problem for Spain and still is. The unemploy-
ment situation in Spain is getting worse and worse. The main reason for the fast increase in 
unemployment is that as many as fully 20 per cent of the Spanish labour force were engaged 
in the construction sector when the crisis in that sector started. The regional differences in 
Spain are another explanation but also among other things the high indebtedness, a week de-
mand, lower capital inflows from abroad, low activity rates and the worse correlation between 
its educational level and job characteristics explain the current situation. The estimated 
unemployment rate for 2012 is as high as 24.2 per cent. The unemployment rate for young 
workers is as high as 46 per cent.    
 
Spain’s need of capital is huge, as mentioned, Bankia will need 19 billion euros to repay its 
current debts but also the rest of the Spanish banking system has similar problems caused by 
the housing recession. Spain’s estimated national debt in relation to GDP was 79.04 per cent, 
839.95 billion euros, this year and Spain’s external debt 1 779 973 million euros. EU’s grants 
and support to Spain are mostly used for solving the banking crisis.       
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New structural reforms in the areas of education, innovation, increased competition and pen-
sion systems have to be enacted. Besides, Spain needs to review its decreasing employment, 
inequalities and create a link between higher education and businesses. The number of 
sectors, which contribute with much value to the rest of the economy, has to be developed. 
Besides, restrictions on natural resources are of main importance for a future economic 
growth to exist.  
 
To what extent Spain has followed the different phases of capitalism varies but Spain has to 
some extent followed each phase. Spain’s development during Kaletsky’s Capitalism 2 is 
what differs the most due to the distrust of the Franco government and the periodic isolation. 
The same result occurs when examining the Spanish economy in comparison with Keynes’ 
and Friedman’s theories. More similarities can be found between Spain’s development and 
Friedman’s theories than between Spain’s development and Keynes’ theories. The fact that 
Spain did not take greater part of the Golden Age of Keynesian economics is of importance to 
be able to understand the severe situation Spain is facing today. The opinions about whether 
Friedman has influenced Spain positively or negatively are dual. Fisher’s debt-deflation 
theory, Reinhardt’s and Rogoff’s study of the varieties of financial crisis, Kaminsky’s and 
Reinhardt’s study of the links between banking and currency crisis and Wihlborg’s lecture 
about the Crisis in the Euro-zone and in Banks – “too Big to Fail” and “too Big to Save” 
give an overall understanding for economic crisis but cannot be applied on Spain in the same 
way as, for example, Keynes’, Friedman’s and Kaletsky’s theories. For a deeper under-
standing of the above mentioned economic theories I refer to the theoretical analysis in 
chapter 5.2.            
 
The current difficulties Spain is facing can partially be solved by both already existing econo-
mic theories as well as by new ones. Keynes’ theories, for example, regarding fiscal stimulus 
and expansionary monetary policy, could to a degree help Spain out of its current situation but 
some new ideas are necessary. Kaletsky’s Capitalism 4.0 can most likely diminish today’s 
problems by giving both the government and the market a chance to improve the growth, 
productivity, housing prices, the corporate indebtedness, interest rates and unemployment 
rates as well as national deficit and debt to some extent. The Bernanke doctrine about preser-
ving price stability should be applied by Spain in the future. Further, Mishkin’s lessons should 
be considered during future decision makings. The basic framework for monetary policy 
strategy needs to be reviewed and the financial sector’s activities have to be regulated more 
thoroughly.    
 
*** 
 
Without any academic qualities, I would like to add some personal remarks. I am convinced 
that the new phase of capitalism with strict rules to control the short term greed - with the 
short term profit as the main goal – with other relevant actions will lead to a better future 
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situation for Spain in general economic terms such as greater economic growth, lower unem-
ployment rate, lower inflation, lower deficit and debt etcetera.  
 
What is more important is that we have to act to handle the lack of natural resources, the 
growing world population and the effects of the climate change, which consequences, in my 
opinion, will be more severe than according to the common opinion. Scientists state that it 
will not be possible for an increasing amount of people to live in big cities. Instead people 
will have to move in the other direction due to among other things lack of energy. Agriculture 
has to change from big scale to a more intensive farming involving a bigger part of the 
world’s population. If the world can agree on this, I am convinced that we will be able to 
create a world with higher life quality than in today’s world. Personal initiatives and small 
scale activities will be more important than multinational greed both for Spain and the rest of 
the world. Thus, self-sufficiency will be of bigger importance, but this time due to actual need 
and not due to political isolation, as during the Franco era.   
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